Ever since Aristotle identified that the “true forms of government, therefore, are those in
which the one, the few, or the many govern with a view to the common interests,” political
philosophers and practitioners have been concerned about corrupt governments: those perverted
forms that “rule with a view to the private interest.”1 Aristotle, Polybius, Machiavelli and the 16th
century Italians, Harrington and the 17th and 18th century English writers who became known as
Whigs or commonwealthmen, and
with the problem of corruption. Their search for an incorruptible form of true government
required that they understand how corruption perverted government. Their ideas about
corruption ranged from the moral and ethical values of princes and people to features of legal
systems and political institutions. In the late 17th and early 18th century a specific concept of
corruption, what I call “systematic corruption,” crystallized in
American colonies and
or more designing and implementing constitutional reforms to protect their political systems
against systematic corruption. Balanced or mixed government was the cure. Modern
economic
development was the result.
American founders used language about the danger of slavery, tyranny, conspiracy, and corruption that seem to us so highly exaggerated that it must have been purely rhetorical, or even propaganda. The great contribution of Bernard Bailyn was to demonstrate that Whigs and American revolutionaries, in fact, believed exactly what they were saying
Paradoxically, British and American citizens believed they lived under the best system of
constitutional government ever devised, one where a mixed and balanced constitution of
government protected individual liberties and freedoms. Americans had a deep and abiding fear
that if they were not vigilant in protecting their liberties today, that their governments would
become corrupt and quickly evolve into tyrannies tomorrow. In other words, they worried about
what was going to happen next.
国家岁入的绝大部分却来源于间接税、关税和消费税。60
一个全国政府能够以极少费用进一步扩大进口税,这同各州单独地、或局部邦联所能做到的,简直不能相提并论。61
如果各州联合于一个政府下面,那么全国只要负担一份公务人员的薪金;如果各州分为几个邦联,就需要负担许多份不同的公务员薪金,而且其中的每一份,就主要部门而论,范围与全国政府所需要的同样广大。把各州分为十三个各不相关的独立国,是一个过于奢想的计划,而且充满危险,不会有许多人拥护。那些考虑肢解这个国家的人们的意见,一般倾向于组成三个邦联——一个包括北部四州,另一个包括中部四州,第三个包括南部五州。63
70美国人民在追求一种新的和更为崇高的事业。他们完成了一次人类社会史上无可比拟的革命。他们建立了地球上尚无范例的政府组织。
经验教导我们,在政治学中还没有什么技巧能充分肯定地辨别和解释其三大领域——立法,行政和司法,甚至不同立法部门的特权和权力。在实践中每天发生一些问题,这就证明在这些问题上还存在着含糊之处,并且使最伟大的政治学家深感为难。
多少年的经验,加上最开明的立法者和法学家的不断合作,在说明各种法典和各种司法机关的若干对象和范围时,同样是不成功的。
181
如果寻求这个问题的回答时,不求助于原则,而是求助于政治作家们在各国宪法中关于这个名词的应用,是决不会得到满意的回答的。192
与其不适当地限制立法机关的权威使政府为难并危及公共安全,不如去冒滥用信任的危险。128
264防止把某些权力逐渐集中于同一部门的最可靠办法,就是给予各部门的主管人抵制其他部门侵犯的必要法定手段和个人的主动。在这方面,如同其他各方面一样,防御规定必须与攻击的危险相称。野心必须用野心来对抗。人的利益必然是与当地的法定权利相联系。用这种种方法来控制政府的弊病,可能是对人性的一种耻辱。但是政府本身若不是对人性的最大耻辱,又是什么呢?如果人都是天使,就不需要任何政府了。如果是天使统治人,就不需要对政府有任何外来的或内在的控制了。
在组织一个人统治人的政府时,最大困难在于必须首先使政府能管理被统治者,然后再使政府管理自身。毫无疑问,依靠人民是对政府的主要控制;但是经验教导人们,必须有辅助性的预防措施。
324为了把政府演变成一种专制寡头政体,参议院显然必须首先自己腐化,接着还要腐化各州的议会,腐化众议院,最后还得普遍腐化人民。显然,参议院如不首先腐化,就不可能企图建立专制统治。如不首先腐化各州议会,参议院也就不可能实现这一企图,因为定期轮换其成员必然会更新整个机构。如不同样也腐化众议院,作为在政府中并存而又平等的众议院不可避免地会挫败这一企图;而如不腐化人民本身,新议员的接替必将使一切恢复其原有秩序。难道有人可能当真相信,拟议中的参议院竟能在人类能力所及的范畴之内,以任何可能的方式,克服这一切障碍,达到它那无法无天的野心目的么?
356 在这个问题上,不可能需要提出更多的论点和实例。软弱无力的行政部门必然造成软弱无力的行政管理,而软弱无力无非是管理不善的另一种说法而已;管理不善的政府,不论理论上有何说辞,在实践上就是个坏政府。
“行政权集于一人更易于加以规范;人民的警惕和监督只有一个对象,这样就安全得多;总之,执掌行政权的人越多,越不利于自由。362
批准宪草造成的额外开支,远不及可以想象之多;并可以由相当节省所抵消;虽然节约与额外开支究竟何者为多尚难预计,但可以肯定的则是:再事节支之政府必难维护联邦之宗旨。434